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Constitutionalism in Eastern Europe:
Alternatives to the Liberal Social Contract
Brad R. Roth*
I. Introduction: Constitutionalism and the Mission of the State in
the New Eastern Europe
One of the striking phenomena attending the sudden and dra-
matic transformations that have swept through Eastern and Central
Europe has been a resurgent interest in constitutionalism. This is not
to say simply that constitutions are being rewritten throughout the
region, though this is certainly true. It is hardly notable that new
documents are being devised to give the new order formal confirma-
tion, for that process almost always attends political transformations,
as it did two generations ago when "people's democracy" became the
regional watchword. The new and striking phenomenon is constitu-
tionalism-that is to say, constitutions being promulgated not
merely as the symbol of the new order, but as the basis of it.
A central demand of newly-empowered Eastern and Central
European political constituencies has been the establishment (often
termed, with varying degrees of accuracy, the "restoration") of "rule
of law." And "rule of law" is here meant not simply as rule by law,
the exercise of potentially unlimited authority through a stable and
predictable process of legal regulation - however great an advance
that might be over the capricious practices of the former regimes.
Rule of law, for the East's former dissidents, means law operating as
an actual limitation on the exercise of power by governmental enti-
ties. The anchor of rule of law is the concept that the constitution
alone provides the source, and thereby the limitation, of governmen-
tal authority. The mark of a genuine constitutionalist order is that
the constitution, far from merely embodying a program, actually op-
erates as the highest law of the land.
The Eastern European constitutionalist impulse is firmly
grounded in the decades of Communist Party misrule that comprise
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the region's recent history. That period was marked by the unbridled
exercise of state power, the adverse consequences of which could be
seen in nearly every facet of life. Neither individuals nor society as a
whole had recourse against arbitrary state actions. Unchecked state
power to deprive persons of economic livelihood, liberty, and even
life itself rendered individuals largely unable to express themselves
creatively, religiously, or politically. Total lack of accountability ena-
bled the "workers' state" to install a new privileged class of party
functionaries, to misallocate resources, to desecrate the environment,
and otherwise to ignore the public interest in its decisionmaking.
Whatever the disagreements regarding remedies for the ills that be-
set these nations, there can be little disagreement about the need to
fundamentally restructure the state so as to restrain state entities
from again making war against the individual and society. This is
the constitutionalist project.
The generalized demand for constitutionalism in Eastern Eu-
rope has been accompanied by a second, distinct phenomenon: the
rise of classical liberalism as the theoretical framework for legal and
political change in the region. The two phenomena, easily conflated
by those trained in the liberal tradition, have in common a call for
"limited government." The liberal conception of limited government,
however, goes beyond anything necessarily implied by constitutional-
ism. Constitutionalism regulates and restrains the exercise of power
by governmental entities, and .thereby places limits on the organs of
government. Liberalism, particularly in its classical, free market-ori-
ented form, places limits on the scope of governance. From the lib-
eral standpoint, institutional arrangements are well ordered to the
extent that they provide for the realization, not of freedom through
good government, but of freedom from government.'
Liberalism thus suggests a possible form of constitutionalism,
that form most familiar to Americans. All constitutionalism antici-
pates the possibility that governmental power will be abused; liberal
constitutionalism asserts that powerful government is by its very na-
1. See, e.g., Andrzej Rapaczynski, Constitutional Politics in Poland: A Report on the
Constitutional Committee of the Polish Parliament, 58 U. CHI. L. REv. 595, 618 (1991).
The present article's references to liberalism emphasize the approach of classical liberal
theorists, whose work developed and extended the thought of John Locke. This approach is
often referred to as "nineteenth-century liberalism." It has been suggested to me that my
argument ignores or disparages the movement.in contemporary liberal thought away from lais-
sez-faire and "possessive individualism," and that the proposals of this article in no way con-
tradict the essence of liberalism.
Although I remain convinced of the limits of welfare liberalism and am dubious of recent
claims for liberalism's ."communitarian" potential, I should happily grant any point that
strengthens my essential assertion, i.e., the compatibility of radical communitarianism with
constitutionalism. Moreover, whatever the merits of the newfangled "communitarian liber-
alism," the "nineteenth-century" variant has in fact dominated the current discourse on East-
ern European constitutional reform.
[Vol. 11:2
CONSTITUTIONALISM IN EASTERN EUROPE
ture a detriment to freedom. All constitutionalism complexifies
processes for the exercise of power,' especially in providing avenues
for the assertion of rights by individuals or groups affected by that
exercise; liberal constitutionalism fragments the sources of power
and recognizes insuperable rights inherent in the individual, indepen-
dent of the interests of society.
The rise of liberalism comes at the expense of a communitarian
vision of a strong state, embodying the collective will, providing the
basis for all sectors of society to enjoy equally a more expansive and
affirmative freedom of human activity.' This communitarian vision,
espoused by the anticonstitutionalist leaderships of the Eastern and
Central European regimes, is now widely associated with those re-
gimes' abuses of power, and is in considerable disrepute.
Numerous liberal commentators have described the rise of liber-
alism as the ineluctable and permanent consequence of the collapse
of the Communist system, a consequence generalized not just to all
of Eastern and Central Europe, but to the rest of the world as well.
As Carl Gershman of the National Endowment for Democracy has
noted:
It has to be remembered that until recently there was a strong
feeling that there was an alternative out there to liberal democ-
racy. There was a belief in a higher form of democracy, one that
emphasized results, equality, that could really achieve things."
According to R. Bruce McColm of Freedom House, "What we're
looking at now is the end of utopianism and the all-encompassing
model to explain human society."'5
Polish constitutional scholar Wiktor Osiatynski puts the point
more starkly in the Eastern European context:
2. The inelegant word "complexify," as opposed to "complicate," emphasizes that the
introduction of complexity is deliberate, and not an unintended by-product of efforts to achieve
other ends. It is characteristic of constitutionalism to develop independent organs with overlap-
ping competences, so as to place an institutional check on discretionary authority. The actual
configuration of the institutions is secondary, so long as unilateral exercises of plenary author-
ity are avoided.
3. Until recently, the word "communitarianism" was primarily associated with the
Christian Democratic movement, which asserted as its project "to convert the state, as rector
of the common good, into the maximum expression of communitarian life." MICHAEL FLEET,
THE RISE AND FALL OF CHILEAN CHRISTIAN DEMOCRACY 57, n.21 (1985) (quoting the Chil-
ean party's platform from its first National Congress in 1959). The word was intended, espe-
cially by the movement's left wing, to establish a link between quasi-socialist economic policies
and traditional corporatist conceptions of community obligation.
This article's use of the term refers to the link suggested by the Christian Democrats'
usage, and is not intended to refer directly to the controversies recently sparked by such theo-
rists as Michael Sandel and Charles Taylor. See, e.g., Amy Gutmann, Communitarian Critics
of Liberalism, 14 PHILOSOPHY & PUBLIC AFFAIRS 308 (1985) (outlining the philosophical
debates of the early 1980's on justice and rights versus virtue and the common good).
4. Richard Bernstein, New Issues Born from Communism's Death Knell, N.Y. TIMES,
Aug. 31, 1991, at 1, 1.
5. Id.
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People are discarding today most of what they deeply believed in
only a year ago, such as economic security and the right to
work. They are even throwing away the beliefs, including equal-
ity and social justice, that led them to fight communism.'
"Socialism with a human face," reports Osiatynski, though once
widely the goal of Eastern European oppositionists, has been dis-
missed as "a contradiction in terms."7
Nonetheless, there are indications that there remains, at least in
much of the region, a deep-rooted resistance to liberal ideas. Despite
the spectacular failures of "Third Way" political formations (e.g.,
New Forum/Alliance '90 in the former GDR, Imre Poszgay's re-
vamped ex-Communists in Hungary) in the first wave of elections,
and the strong free-market drift of initially victorious groups bearing
a significant leftist heritage (e.g., Solidarity in Poland, Civic Forum
in Czechoslovakia), attitudes on specific issues, whether of the
"bread-and-butter" or more conceptual variety, appear far more
equivocal.
As Dr. Osiatynski himself laments, Polish "strikers are defend-
ing the very values and mechanisms that hamper the growth of capi-
talism and free markets, i.e., egalitarianism, agreement to waste,
inefficiency, and lack of personal responsibility for the results of
one's actions and for one's life." 8 Anecdotal evidence, polling data,
and some recent election results (most notably in the now-indepen-
dent Slovakia) indicate continuing widespread support for large-scale
state intervention in the economy. Even the most liberal of the re-
vised constitutions and constitutional drafts include some version of
the familiar panoply of economic rights espoused in Communist con-
stitutions (as well as express qualifications of individual rights).9
Further experience with the harsh costs of radical free-market re-
forms may plausibly reinforce the tendency to see the state as re-
sponsible, not merely for order and infrastructure, but also for sub-
stantive equality and economic security.
At the same time, and relatedly, it is far from clear that East-
ern and Central Europeans regard the essential mission of democ-
racy in liberal terms. As Andrzej Rapaczynski has noted with re-
spect to Poland, there persists a continental European conception of
6. Wiktor Osiatynski, Revolutions in Eastern Europe, 58 U. CHI. L. REv. 823, 824-25
(1991).
7. Id. at 843.
8. Id. at 858.
9. The former Czechoslovakia's Charter of Fundamental Rights and Freedoms (enacted
on January 9, 1991) illustrates the point. The Charter establishes rights to, inter alia, satisfac-
tory wages and working conditions (Arts. 28, 29), unemployment, old-age and disability com-
pensation (Arts. 26(3), 30), free medical care (Art. 31), and education (Art. 33). It also pro-
vides that political rights may be limited by "measures essential in a democratic society for
protecting . . . public security . . . and morality" (Art. 17(4)).
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the polity that "flies in the face of the oft-repeated allegiance to the
ideas of liberalism"; the state is widely accorded the role of articu-
lating a "general will," obedience to which is equated with freedom
- a notion that liberals perceive as dangerously wrongheaded.' 0
If what has occurred in Eastern and Central Europe is indeed
not "the end of ideology" (or, more precisely, the eternal triumph of
classical liberalism over rival ideologies), communitarian bases for
constitutionalism become an important subject of study. If Eastern
and Central Europeans largely operate from non-liberal assumptions
about the role of the state, does it follow that they are doomed to
repeat the patterns of the past - the unrestrained exercise of gov-
ernmental authority and the trammelling of the individual in the
purported pursuit of an ideal communitarian vision?
The thesis of this article is that a positive, communitarian con-
ception of the role of the state is consistent with the demand for
limitation on oppressive exercises of governmental power. Indeed,
such a conception properly incorporates constitutionalism as a funda-
mental tenet, albeit in a form significantly different from the liberal
version.
II. Intellectual Foundations of the Communitarian Vision
A. The Communitarian Critique of the Liberal Social Contract
The liberal understanding of the project of governance has its
origins in John Locke's conception of the social contract. In the
Lockean imagination, the individual consents to governance only as a
means to preserve the better part of his "natural" freedom. The po-
litical community, i.e., the state, operates on the basis of a mutual
agreement to defend pre-existing (i.e., pre-social) individual rights.1
These rights are solely negative in character - rights against delib-
erate encroachments upon individual autonomy - and operate to
defend the sphere of self-interested activity.
Lest there be any question about this latter point, Locke made
explicit the centrality of private property to the very existence of the
state, and the incompatibility of redistribution with the state's fun-
damental purposes:
10. See Rapaczynski, supra note 1, at 617-18.
11. See, e.g., JOHN LOCKE, An Essay Concerning the True Original, Extent and End of
Civil Government (Ch. VIII, para. 95), in Two TREATISES OF GOVERNMENT 117, 164 (1983):
Men being . . . by nature all free, equal, and independent, no one can be
put out of this estate and subjected to the political power of another without his
own consent, which is done by agreeing with other men, to join and unite into a
community for their comfortable, safe, and peaceable living, one amongst an-
other, in a secure enjoyment of their properties, and a greater security against
any that are not of it.
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[T]he supreme power cannot take from any man any part
of his property without his consent. For the preservation of prop-
erty being the end of government, and that for which men enter
into society, it necessarily supposes and requires that the people
should have property, without which they must be supposed to
lose that by entering into society which was the end for which
they entered into it; too gross an absurdity for any man to
own.
1 2
The primacy of private ends was explicit in Locke's work.
The liberal state's task is to maximize the area in which the
individual can act for his private ends, unobstructed by others. The
state's challenge is to protect against individual invasion without, in
the process, encroaching unduly on the very sphere it exists to de-
fend.13 However much more complex the modern liberal state's func-
tions than was foreseen by Locke (or his foremost devotees, the
framers of the United States Constitution), the preservation of this
balance - "ordered liberty" - remains the fundamental goal of the
liberal state, and the focus of liberal constitutionalism.
From the modesty of the liberal state's mission follows the mod-
esty of the role accorded democracy in the liberal conception. Liber-
alism conceives democracy as a means by which the citizenry checks
the power of the state by retaining the option to replace leaders at
periodic elections. Since freedom is pursued individually and not col-
lectively, no premium is placed on direct participation in decision-
making, nor is democratic participation a norm to be generalized to
other realms, such as the workplace. Voters in a democracy have the
same influence on governmental decisionmaking as consumers do on
business decisionmaking - not by taking an active part in the pro-
cess, but by rewarding or punishing decisions based on the favorable
or unfavorable aggregate results. In judging these results, voters are
expected not to rise above their selfish interests but to defend those
interests, so that the diverse interests of different sectors of the popu-
lace arrive at some equilibrium level of partial satisfaction. 4 The
premier liberal constitution, that of the United States, provides fur-
ther for the fragmentation of state power, so as to minimize the like-
lihood that any one set of interests can control enough of the govern-
ment to effectuate an activist state program that would encroach on
other sets of interests.
Not surprisingly, liberalism has been most firmly entrenched as
12. Id. (ch. XI, para. 138) at 187.
13. See CRAWFORD BROUGH (C.B.) MACPHERSON, Berlin's Division of Liberty, in DEM-
OCRATIC THEORY: ESSAYS IN RETRIEVAL 95, 98 (1973); Isaiah Berlin, Two Concepts of Lib-
erty, in FOUR ESSAYS ON LIBERTY 118 (1969).
14. See CRAWFORD BROUGH MACPHERSON, THE LIFE AND TIMES OF LIBERAL DEMOC-
RACY 77-92 (1977) (discussing "equilibrium democracy").
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the dominant ideology in early-developing countries where the eco-
nomic activity of private entrepreneurs was the driving force in in-
dustrialization, i.e., the United Kingdom and the United States.
These countries' developmental strategies fit naturally with the pro-
tection of the prerogatives of private owners of the means of produc-
tion; the state had comparatively little direct role in the formative
period of industrialization, and primarily (though by no means ex-
clusively) pursued laissez-faire policies..
Industrialization in continental Europe, on the other hand, came
later and was (not coincidentally) largely state-driven, not just under
fascism and Communism but in, for example, late nineteenth-cen-
tury capitalist Germany. 15 Albeit to varying degrees, the state in
continental European countries has been much more activist; all sec-
tors of society have looked to the state for positive accomplish-
ments.16 It is, therefore, logical that communitarianism, of one form
or anothet, has had staying power in continental European political
and legal thought, and the more so the farther one looks to the East.
Often, this communitarianism has been conservative and self-
consciously anti-egalitarian, appealing to traditional sources of au-
thority and espousing a corporatist conception of society. In pursuit
of the common project, each sector has been assigned a role in the
hierarchy, decisionmaking being limited to those best suited to the
task. This authoritarian-corporatist version of communitarianism has
played a significant role in continental European history, fascism be-
ing a malignant offshoot of that tradition.
Equally significant, however, has been the revolutionary concep-
tion of community that has animated continental European social
movements since the French revolution of 1789, and especially since
the uprisings of 1848.17 This communitarian tradition, to which
Jean-Jacques Rousseau and Karl Marx have been the most notable
intellectual contributors, rejects both authoritarian-corporatist com-
munitarianism and liberalism in favor of a sweeping program of so-
cial transformation that emphasizes equal empowerment and mate-
rial entitlement.
The goal of this program is the effectuation of what Isaiah Ber-
lin aptly termed "positive" liberty, freedom understood not in terms
of barriers against encroachment on the pursuit of private interests,
15. See James R. Kurth, The Political Consequences of the Product Cycle, 33 INT'L
ORGANIZATION 1, 6-9, 11-12 (1979) (exploring the link between late industrialization, state-
driven economic development, and non-liberal politics).
16. See GOSTA ESPING-ANDERSEN, THE THREE WORLDS OF WELFARE CAPITALISM 58-
65 (1990) (contrasting the histories of the Anglo-American and continental European ap-
proaches to social policy).
17. See Osiatynski, supra note 6, at 823 (attributing the ingrained beliefs of Polish
workers and intellectuals to the "utopian" mentality of the 1848 revolutions).
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but in terms of the ability to engage in genuinely self-directed
activity:
The "positive" sense of the word "liberty" derives from the wish
on the part of the individual to be his own master. I wish my life
and decisions to depend on myself, not on external forces of
whatever kind. I wish to be the instrument of my own, not of
other men's, acts of will. I wish to be a subject, not an object; to
be moved by reasons, by conscious purposes which are my own,
not by causes which affect me, as it were, from outside. I wish to
be somebody, not nobody; a doer - deciding, not being decided
for, self-directed and not acted upon by external nature or by
other men as if I were a thing, or an animal, ora slave incapa-
ble of playing a human role, that is, of conceiving goals and
policies of my own and realizing them.18
Rousseau and Marx, in different but related ways, suggested social
arrangements aimed at achieving this ambitious project.
Rousseau assailed the liberal version of the social contract, in
which, as he put it, the rich man entreats the poor, "Let us join...
to guard the weak from oppression, to restrain the ambitious, and
secure to every man the possession of what belongs to him . . .":
Such was, or may well have been, the origin of society and
law, which bound new fetters on the poor, and gave new powers
to the rich; which irretrievably destroyed natural liberty, eter-
nally fixed the law of property and inequality, converted clever
usurpation into inalterable right, and, for the advantage of a few
ambitious individuals, subjected all mankind to perpetual labor,
slavery and wretchedness.' 9
The liberal social contract suspends the "state of nature" so as to
bring about the unnatural result that "moral inequality, authorized
by positive right alone," exceeds physical inequality, that "the privi-
leged few should gorge themselves with superfluities, while the starv-
ing multitude are in want of the bare necessities of life."20
Rousseau shared Locke's recognition that man's "natural" lib-
erty is beyond recovery. He denied, however, that Locke's partial
concession to sociality could result in anything other than oppression
at the hands of those whose private interests are empowered and
shielded by the liberal state. The goal of social arrangements must
be, for Rousseau, not freedom from encroachments by (or responsi-
bilities to) other individuals and the social whole, but genuine human
freedom for all members of the society, i.e., equal freedom of each
18. Berlin, Two Concepts of Liberty, supra note 13, at 131.
19. Jean Jacques Rousseau, A Discourse on the Origin of Inequality, in THE SOCIAL
CONTRACT AND DISCOURSEs 27, 89 (G.D.H. Cole trans. 1973).
20. Id. at 105.
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individual to act fully in accordance with his own conscious pur-
poses, albeit in connection with others. Sociality, once conceded,
must be fully embraced, yet reconciled with maximal self-determina-
tion. Rousseau found the resolution in a process by which social deci-
sions are made with the equal participation of, and equally in the
interests of, all members of society.
Rousseau's reaction to liberalism relates closely to that of Karl
Marx, whose thought was premised on a continental European intel-
lectual tradition that Rousseau had profoundly influenced. Both
Rousseau and Marx saw as liberalism's flaw the partial recognition
of human sociality, and both shared the communitarian vision of a
harmonious and maximal human self-determination. 1 Marx went
beyond Rousseau, however, in seeking, not to harmonize conflicting
individual interests, but to transform social relations - a task that
requires as a transitional step the equal empowerment embodied in
the Rousseauian model - so as ultimately to eliminate contradictory
interests, and with them all need of coercive societal authority.
Marx's early essay, "On the Jewish Question," expressed the
communitarian critique of liberal constitutionalism. In this essay,
Marx examined the conception of liberty contained in the liberal
constitutions of the late eighteenth century:
Liberty is ...the right to do everything which does not
harm others. The limits within which each individual can act
without harming others are determined by law, just as a bound-
ary between two fields is marked by a stake. It is a question of
the liberty of man regarded as an isolated monad, withdrawn
into himself .. . .[L]iberty as a right of man is not founded
upon the relations between man and man, but rather upon the
separation of man from man. It is the right of the circumscribed
individual, withdrawn into himself.22
According to Marx, the practical application of such an asocial
liberty is the right to private property, which consists of
the right to enjoy one's fortune and to dispose of it as one will;
without regard for other men and independently of society. It is
the right of self-interest. . . .It leads every man to see in other
men, not the realization, but rather the limitation of his own
liberty.23
21. The relationship between Rousseau and Marx is illuminatingly explored in Lucio
COLLETTI, Rousseau as Critic of "Civil Society", in FROM ROUSSEAU TO LENIN 143-93 (John
Merrington & Judith White trans., 1972). That Marx did not acknowledge, or probably even
recognize, his indebtedness to Rousseau is testimony to the subtle pervasiveness of the latter's
influence on continental European thought.
22. Karl Marx, On the Jewish Question, in THE MARX-ENGELS READER [hereinafter
MER] 26, 42 (Robert C. Tucker ed., 1978) (emphasis in original) [hereinafter Marx].
23. Id. (emphasis in original).
Winter 1993]
DICKINSON JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL LAW
This liberal or "negative" conception of liberty has profound
implications for political life. Marx noted that the French revolution-
ary constitutions spoke of the "Rights of Man and of the Citizen."
He examined the distinction in this line of thought between man, a
member of civil society, on the one hand, and citizen, a member of
the political community, on the other. What Marx found remarkable
was the thorough subordination of the political community to civil
society, to the arena of private interest and egoism. "The end of
every political association," stated one of the French constitutions,
"is the preservation of the natural and imprescriptible rights of
man." Four such rights were enumerated: liberty and property, as
explained above, and equality and security. Equality, according to
Marx, had "no political significance" in this context. "It is only the
equal right to liberty as defined above; namely that every man is
equally regarded as a self-sufficient monad." Security, however, was
significant indeed:
Security is the supreme social concept of civil society; the
concept of the police. The whole society exists only in order to
guarantee for each of its members the preservation of his person,
his rights and his property.2 '
Thus, all of the "rights of man," Marx concluded, concern the "indi-
vidual separated from the community, withdrawn into himself,
wholly preoccupied with his private interest and acting in accordance
with his private caprice."25
A central theme in Marxian thought is the idea of man as a
"species being," a being whose very existence is sociality;2 human
freedom in isolation is inconceivable. This notion is completely for-
eign to the liberal "rights of man":
Man is far from being considered, in the rights of man, as a
species-being; on the contrary, species-life itself - society -
appears as a system which is external to the individual and as a
limitation of his original independence. The only bond between
men is natural necessity, need and private interest, the preserva-
24. Id. at 43.
25. Id.
26. See, e.g., Marx, Economic and Philosophic Manuscripts of 1844, in MER, supra
note 22, at 66, 86:
[Even] when I am active scientifically, etc., - when I am engaged in activ-
ity which I can seldom perform in direct community with others - then I am
social, because I am active as a man. Not only is the material of my activity
given to me as a social product (as is even the language in which the thinker is
active): my own existence is social activity, and therefore that which I make of
myself, I make of myself for society and with the consciousness of myself as a
social being.
Id. (emphasis in original).
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tion of their property and their egoistic persons."
Thus,
we observe that the political liberators [liberals] reduce citizen-
ship, the political community, to a mere means for preserving
these so-called rights of man, and consequently, that the citizen
is declared to be the servant of egoistic "man," that the sphere
in which man functions as a species-being is degraded to a level
below the sphere where he functions as a partial being, and fi-
nally that it is man as a bourgeois and not man as a citizen who
is considered the true and authentic man."
According to Marx, "free, conscious activity is man's species
character."2 9 Realization of true human freedom requires a social
transformation that overcomes egoism and harnesses the means of
production - no longer privately held - to the creation of the ma-
terial preconditions to conscious activity. "Human emancipation will
only be complete when the real, individual man . . . in his everyday
life, in his work, and in his relationships, . . . has become a species-
being."3 0 For this "species character" to be realized, the "citizen" -
the moral, social person engaging in conscious action - must cease
being a mere abstraction, a member of an "allegorical" political
community, and become a reality.
Freedom . . . can only consist in socialized man, the associated
producers, rationally regulating their interchange with Nature,
bringing it under their common control instead of being ruled by
it as by the blind forces of Nature; and achieving this with the
least expenditure of energy and under conditions most favour-
able to, and worthy of, their human nature. But it nonetheless
still remains a realm of necessity. Beyond it begins that develop-
ment of human energy which is an end in itself, the true realm
of freedom, which, however, can blossom forth only with the
realm of necessity as its basis .... 3'
Marx envisaged post-revolutionary history as proceeding -
within an uncertain time frame - toward a final stage of communist
society in which no conflicting interests would remain. Advances in
productive technology, rationally managed, would not only create
sufficient abundance to satisfy all needs, but also transform the na-
ture of labor, so that it would "become not only a means of life but
27. Marx, On the Jewish Question, in MER, supra note 22, at 43.
28. Id.
29. Marx, Economic and Philosophic Manuscripts of 1844, in MER, supra note 22, at
76.
30. Marx, On the Jewish Question, in MER, supra note 22, at 46.
31. Marx, Capital, Vol. III, excerpted in MER, supra note 22, 439, 441.
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life's prime want,' '3 2 the expression of human creativity. Each would
naturally work according to his ability, and could be remunerated
according to his need. All need of coercion having therefore ended,
the organization of society would lose its "political" character and
take on a "business" character.33 The state (in the sense of a coer-
cive entity) would thus, in Friedrich Engels' words, "wither away."
Whatever may be said of the "withered" state in the final stage
of communist society, the agent of the social transformation was to
be nonetheless a decidedly strong state, a "dictatorship of the prole-
tariat," capable of overcoming entrenched class interests and re-
orienting the economy and society in a socialist direction. Marx saw
this "dictatorship" as an expression of genuine popular sovereignty,
with the most direct input by the working people in the decisionmak-
ing and administrative processes of the state.34
Underlying Marx's vision of proletarian dictatorship was a tra-
dition of democratic thought that had as its unmistakable source the
writings of Rousseau. Indeed, the Italian theorist Lucio Colletti has
gone so far as to assert that "revolutionary 'political' theory, as it
has developed since Rousseau, is already foreshadowed and con-
tained in The Social Contract," and that Marx and Lenin have
added nothing, other than an analysis of the economic prerequisites
to the realization of a polity that expresses the general will.35
B. The General Will
Whatever the special resonance for revolutionary socialists in
Rousseau's conception of the mission of the state, that conception's
appeal is not limited to the far left. Indeed, Rousseau, unlike Marx,
did not seek a totally undifferentiated society, in which no conflicting
interests exist and only the common interest remains. As Rousseau
stated: "If there were no different interests, the common interest
would be barely felt, as it would encounter no obstacle; all would go
on of its own accord, and politics would cease to be an art."36 Rous-
seau envisaged no "withering away" of the state. Moreover, although
he sought to contain private property, he did not seek to abolish it,
and thus allowed for the preservation of "particular" interests in ten-
sion with the common interest.3 7
Rousseau described the objective of his version of the social con-
32. Marx, Critique of the Gotha Program, in MER, supra note 22, 525, 530-31.
33. See Marx, After the Revolution: Marx Debates Bakunin (editor's title), in MER,
supra note 22, 542, 545.
34. See Marx, The Civil War in France. in MER, supra note 22, 618.
35. Colletti, supra note 21, at 185.
36. Jean Jacques Rousseau, The Social Contract, in THE SOCIAL CONTRACT AND DIs-
COURSES (G.D.H. Cole trans. 1973) 164, 185 n.1 (1:9) [hereinafter Rousseau].
37. Id. at 181 n.1 (1:9), 204 (11:11).
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tract as follows:
The problem is to find a form of association which will de-
fend and protect with the whole common force the persons and
goods of each associate, in which each, while uniting himself
with all, may still obey himself alone, and remain as free as
before." This is the fundamental problem of which the social
contract provides the solution ....
"Each of us puts his person and all his power in common
under the supreme direction of the general will, and, in our cor-
porate capacity, we receive each member as an indivisible part
of the whole."
At once, in place of the individual personality of each con-
tracting party, this act of association creates a corporate and
collective body, composed of as many members as the assembly
contains voters, and receiving from this act its unity, its common
identity, its life, and its will.38
Rousseau advocated direct mass participation in decision-mak-
ing and public service. He derided representative institutions and
professional armies, asserting that those who would hire proxies for
such vital tasks "end by having soldiers to enslave their country and
representatives to sell it."39 Far from sharing the liberal view that
the state ought to leave its people to pursue private matters, he as-
serted: "The better the constitution of a State is, the more do public
affairs encroach on private in the minds of the citizens."'40 In a good
state, the common happiness furnishes a greater part of individual
happiness, so that one has less need to seek fulfillment through the
furtherance of private interests.41 This situation can obtain, however,
only where individuals are precluded from withholding their contri-
bution to the common cause; if persons are allowed to enjoy the ben-
efits of association while shirking the responsibilities, the end result
will be "the undoing of the body politic.' 42
The Rousseauian polity operates on the basis of the "general
will." The general 'will is distinct from the "will of all," which is
merely the aggregation of the particular wills of the members of the
polity. The general will
is always upright and always tends to the public advantage; but
it does not follow that the deliberations of the people always
have the same rectitude. Our will is always for our own good,
but we do not always see what that is; the people is never cor-
rupted, but it is often deceived, and on such occasions only does
38. Id. at 174-75 (1:6).
39. Id. at 239 (111:15).
40. Id.
41. Rousseau, supra note 36, at 240 (111:15).
42. Id. at 177 (1:7).
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it seem to will what is bad.43
That the people can be said to be deceived, so that their will can be
said to stray from the general will, is a central paradox in Rous-
seau's system.
Where the general will governs, freedom consists in obedience
to it, for obedience to the general will is in fact obedience to one's
own will. This is true even with respect to those laws that the indi-
vidual opposed in the assembly. The question put in the assembly is
not whether one desires the law, but whether the law is in conform-
ity with the general will. The passage of a law over his objection
demonstrates merely that his opinion was mistaken, that what he
thought to be the general will was not so. The common interest is
served only by the operation of the general will, and one therefore
always wills for the general will to prevail; he cannot wish for his
mistaken position to have been victorious, as that would have
achieved the opposite of his true will, in which case he would not
have been free. "This presupposes, indeed, that all the qualities of
the general will still reside in the majority: when they cease to do so,
whatever side a man may take, liberty is no longer possible."' 4
Under proper circumstances, the general will is derived from
the aggregate of the various individual wills. "[T]ake away . . .the
pluses and minuses that cancel one another, and the general will re-
mains as the sum of the differences.' 5 The general will can be so
derived when each individual makes his own independent decision.
The problem comes when "intrigues arise, and partial associa-
tions are formed at the expense of the great association." The rise of
distinct interest groups within the polity disrupts the process by
which the general will is formed, since
there are no longer as many votes as there are men, but only as
many as there are associations. The differences become less nu-
merous and give a less general result. Lastly, when one of these
associations is so great as to prevail over all the rest, the result is
no longer a sum of small differences, but a single difference; in
this case there is no longer a general will, and the opinion which
prevails is purely particular.
The only way to safeguard the general will is either to bar such in-
terest groups entirely or, if this is not possible, "to have as many as
possible and prevent them from being unequal."'"
In Rousseau's conception, the general will can operate properly
43. Id. at 184-85 (11:3).
44. Id. at 250-51 (IV:2).
45. Id. at 185 (11:3).
46. Rousseau, supra note 36, at 185 (11:3).
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only in a society where "no citizen shall ever be wealthy enough to
buy another, and none poor enough to be forced to sell himself. 47
Whereas the liberal-democratic tradition is distinguished by its as-
sertion of democracy's compatibility with an economic system
marked by inequality and wage-labor, Rousseau contended that
laws, however derived, "are always of use to those who possess and
harmful to those who have nothing: from which it follows that the
social state is advantageous to men only when all have something
and none too much."'48 Thus, Rousseau's vision, like Thomas Jeffer-
son's, assumes a society of working proprietors, as opposed to either
state socialism or oligopoly capitalism.49 In contemporary terms, any
such vision would presumably require broad economic security and
containment of concentrations of economic power.
If the individual seeks to resist the general will, it is quite ap-
propriate that he be "forced to be free." The formula is such that
each man, in giving himself to all, gives himself to nobody; and
as there is no associate over which he does not acquire the same
right as he yields others over himself, he gains an equivalent for
everything he loses, and an increase of force for the preservation
of what he has. 50
The individual preserves his independence by giving himself to the
whole on the condition that all others do the same. In carrying out
his duty, he serves his own interests, assuming that all others equally
fulfill their duties. He thus freely wills the circumstance in which all
obey the general will, and thereby pursue the common cause, the
common interest. Therefore, when he seeks to evade his duties, he
undermines the common cause, and so acts against his own free will.
True freedom, then, is not equated with the ability to do
whatever one happens to wish at any given moment. It is not free-
dom from encroachment by others, but freedom to be responsible for
and to the social whole. The individual learns to recognize true
human freedom by internalizing discipline, i.e., by coming to the re-
alization that acting in accordance with one's own true will entails
acting in accordance with social responsibilities, as determined by
the social whole.
Viewed from the present day, the identification of freedom With
obedience to the general will has Orwellian overtones that have not
been lost on Rousseau's liberal critics. 1 The potential for abuse
47. Id. at 204 (11:11).
48. Id. at 181 n.1 (1:9).
49. For a discussion of the material preconditions to varying classical models of demo-
cratic participation, see C.B. MACPHERSON, THE LIFE AND TIMES OF LIBERAL DEMOCRACY
(1977).
50. Rousseau, supra note 36, at 174 (1:6).
51. C.B. Macpherson has concisely summarized the problem, paraphrasing Isaiah Berlin
Winter 1993]
DICKINSON JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL LAW
would seen to be exacerbated by Rousseau's own recognition that
the stunting and debasing influences of the societal status quo im-
pede the capacity of the people, by their own initiative, to remake
the society. Individuals, looking to short-term private interests, will
not appreciate the desirability of sacrifice. For the people to acquire
the requisite understanding to implement beneficial institutional
change, "the social spirit, which should be created by these institu-
tions, would have to preside over their very foundation." '52 Rous-
seau's model thus relies heavily on the intellectual guidance of the
"legislator":
He who dares to undertake the making of a people's institutions
ought to feel himself capable, so to speak, of changing human
nature, of transforming each individual, who is by himself a
complete and solitary whole, into part of a greater whole from
which he in a manner receives his life and being; of altering
man's constitution for the purpose of strengthening it; and of
substituting a partial and moral existence for the physical and
independent existence nature has conferred on us all.53
This passage indeed foreshadowed unpleasant historical devel-
opments. 54 Rousseau himself acknowledged the tension in his model
between the imperatives of participation and direction. In inducing
the body politic to accept the direction of the legislator, rational per-
suasion is unfeasible, yet forcible imposition is illegitimate. "The leg-
islator . . . being unable to appeal to either force or reason, must
have recourse to an authority of a different order, capable of con-
straining without violence and persuading without convincing. ' 55
Rousseau's resolution of this conundrum can, with charity, be char-
as follows:
Liberty as self-mastery becomes mastery of a "higher" or "real" self over a
lower, desirous, animal self. Then the "real" self is identified with some social
whole of which the individual is a part, and this organic whole is then taken to
embody all the real of higher selves or wills of all the individuals. So, in impos-
ing its organic will on individuals, the society, or those who act in its name, is
said to achieve a higher liberty for all its members. This is the idealist road (br
slippery slope) which ends in coercion: the individual is forced to be free.
MACPHERSON, DEMOCRATIC THEORY, supra note 13, at 105-06.
52. Rousseau, supra note 36, at 196 (11:7).
53. Id. at 194 (11:7).
54. In Macpherson's characterization:
Freedom is . . . the (rational) recognition of necessity. It requires a state gov-
erned by laws which all men would rationally accept if they were fully rational.
But at present most men are not, whether from having been stunted by prevail-
ing social institutions . . . or from some other cause. So it is in most men's
(rational) interest that others - those who have attained full rationality or have
understood the true forces of history - should impose on them the institutions
which will bring them (as far as they can be brought) to full rationality and,
therefore, full freedom.
MACPHERSON, DEMOCRATIC THEORY, supra note 13, 106 (again paraphrasing Berlin).
55. Rousseau, supra note 36, at 196 (11:7).
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acterized as dubious: the legislator associates his own laws with di-
vine will, and by thus placing religion in the service of politics, ac-
complishes through faith what cannot be achieved through reason.56
The recent history of Eastern and Central Europe provided a
more practical resolution of the tension between participation and
direction: vanguard rule. In this way, both the communitarian cri-
tique of liberal rights and the communitarian conception of the gen-
eral will were placed at the service of a system that managed to
transform the quest for maximal human freedom into the triumph of
tyranny and cynicism.
III. The Communitarian Vision and the Communist Party States
A. Constitutional Consequences of Vanguard Rule
The Communist Party-controlled states of Eastern and Central
Europe drew on the Rousseauian conception of the polity to justify a
system in which individual rights were not conceived as a limitation
on state power. In the words of one commentator:
[T]he Socialist State, as an incarnation of the totality of the
working people, coordinates the interests of society and of the
individual and creates the conditions indispensable to the forma-
tion of unity between the rights and duties of man and citizen.
This unity eliminates the possibility of abusing the law, as the
laws can only be implemented in a manner which does not en-
croach upon social interests. This idea is not new, because it was
already advocated by J.J. Rousseau.57
Yet this "idea" was indeed "new"; it was the superimposition of
a theoretical construct on a problematic reality. Had the statement
begun, "the socialist state, insofar as it is an incarnation of the to-
tality of the working people," it would have been more theoretically
sound and, more importantly, would have left open a question to be
resolved empirically. The actual wording was no accident; it reflected
the tautological style of reasoning typical of apologia for Communist
state practice.
If the relationship between state policy and the general will is
taken as unproblematic, there can be little place for individual
rights, whether of "man" or of "citizen." Soviet constitutional
scholar Veniamin Chirkin (writing in the pre-Gorbachev era)
pointed out, in a manner consistent with communitarian theory, that
"[t]he essence of true freedom for the individual lies not in his inde-
pendence from society, but in those material and spiritual possibili-
56. id.
57. Franciszek Przetacznik, The Socialist Conception of Human Rights, 13 REVUE
BELGE DU DROIT INTERNATIONAL 238, 246 (1977).
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ties which are created for him within it." 8 "The socialist state," he
argued, "creates conditions [e.g., social consumption funds, free edu-
cation, free medical services, and the development of culture] in
which each member of society is offered genuine freedom of choice
as regards the form of his activity, the development and use of his
abilities." 9
So far, so good. Chirkin then continued:
Thus, in place of the bourgeois individualistic concept of
the freedom of the individual, there exists under socialism an-
other, social, dynamic, collectivist concept of that freedom.
Marxism-Leninism understands the freedom of the individual to
mean the freedom of the individual within society, within the
state, within the collective, and not to mean freedom from them.
This freedom is seen as inseparably bound up with the unity of
the basic interests of society, the state, the collective and the
individual .... 60
Be this as it may, if the constitutional structure simply assumes this
"unity of basic interests," rather than being set up to check the
emergence of divergent state interests, the stage is set for unbounded
tyranny in the name of maximal freedom.
Yet precisely this assumption was the essential aspect of Com-
munist constitutions. In promulgating the Soviet Constitution of
1977, Leonid Brezhnev put to rest any idea that the Constitution
might empower citizens, individually or collectively, against the rul-
ing party:
The Communist Party is the vanguard of the Soviet people, their
most class-conscious and advanced segment, inseparable from
the people as a whole. The Party has no interests except the
interests of the people. To try to counterpose the Party to the
people, to talk about the "dictatorship of the Party," is tanta-
mount to trying to counterpose, let us say, the heart to the rest
of the body.61
It comes as no surprise, then, that under the 1977 Constitution,
Soviet citizens were "obliged to safeguard the interests of the Soviet
state, and to enhance its power and prestige" (Article 62), that free-
dom of expression was exercisable only "[iun accordance with the
interests of the people and in order to strengthen and develop the
socialist system" (Art. 50), or that freedom of association was exer-
58. VENIAMIN CHIRKIN, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW AND POLITICAL INSTITUTIONS 30
(1985).
59. Id. at 31.
60. Id. at 31.
61. Brezhnev's Report on the New Constitution, in The Current Digest of the Soviet
Press, Vol. xxix, no. 39, 7 (Oct. 26, 1977).
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cisable only "[i]n. accordance with the aims of building communism"
(Art. 51). In the words of Soviet analyst E.M. Chekharin:
The purpose of the political freedoms which are exercised in
the USSR exclusively in the people's interest is to strengthen the
socialist system and promote the political activity of the masses.
For this reason, these freedoms may not be used to harm the
cause of peace, democracy and socialism. That is why in the
USSR warlike and national and racist propaganda, agitation
and propaganda aimed at undermining or weakening the social-'
ist state, and libel and slander of the Soviet social and state sys-
tem are punishable by law. 2
Nor were these limitations subject to a wide range of interpreta-
tion. The Soviet party, according to Chekharin, "maintains the con-
tinuity of the general line which it has defended in an uncompromis-
ing struggle against Trotskyism, petty-bourgeois adventurism, Right
opportunism, nationalism and other anti-Leninist trends and fac-
tions."63 The struggle was "uncompromising" in that it did not per-
mit the body politic to be deceived; the citizenry was not afforded
the opportunity to make a mistake. The party used a firm hand to
prevent ill-advised detours:
Experience has shown how much waste results for society when
organizational and economic changes are introduced without a
detailed scientific substantiation, preliminary examination and
preparation .. . .Accordingly, the Communist Party and the
Soviet government work out the most expedient ways and means
of knowing and utilizing objective laws under concrete circum-
stances of time and place, introducing unity and purpose to the
nation-wide effort to build a communist society."
The legitimacy of party rule was purported to derive from the
unidirectional nature of the social transformation. Since socialist so-
ciety has a preordained direction that is knowable, the argument
went, it is possible to identify elements of society that are more "ad-
vanced" than others. Their "advanced" nature manifests itself in a
consciousness of and commitment to that preordained direction.
These advanced elements constitute a "vanguard," the party. Like
the Rousseauian legislator, the party must take the lead in building
institutions capable of developing human sociality. Unlike the legis-
lator, however, the party is armed with a science of history that im-
putes to society a set of determinate objectives.
In the Communist Party's deterministic interpretation of Marx's
62. EVGENI MIKHAILOVICH CHEKHARIN, THE SOVIET POLITICAL SYSTEM UNDER DE-
VELOPED SOCIALISM 209-10 (1977).
63. Id. at 42.
64. Id. at 345.
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theory of history, "dialectical materialism" (a term that Marx him-
self never used) was the key to understanding and predicting all his-
torical developments, the key to uncovering the "objective laws" that
govern human activity. Those who had mastered this science were
thus deemed uniquely qualified to provide direction.
Within such a framework, there can be no issue of the vanguard
being answerable to or checked by the popular will, since the popular
will is "iess advanced." The vanguard does not owe its leading posi-
tion to popular approval, however much it may aspire to that and
indeed require that to carry out its tasks successfully; it owes its
leading position to the fact that its line represents, as an "objective"
matter, the best interests of the working class, whether that class
knows it or not.
In the face of objective laws, the role of the citizenry cannot but
be diminished. The German Democratic Republic (GDR), in a
statement before the U.N. Commission on Human Rights, defined
the democratic project as follows: "The essence of socialist democ-
racy consists in the moulding of society in conformity with the objec-
tive laws of development, with guidance by the State and the en-
lightened and committed involvement of the majority of the people
in that process.''65 There is nothing indeterminate or free-wheeling
about this form of democracy. Society is to be molded, and objective
laws determine the way in which this will be accomplished. Those
who will be involved in democracy are those who are committed to
the project and who are enlightened by knowledge of the objective
laws; the uncommitted and the unenlightened need not apply. There
is no question of rejecting "guidance" - anyone proposing that is
either insufficiently public-spirited or else mistaken.
So thoroughly was the party's will identified with the general
will in Communist dogma that would-be Communist dissenters, con-
vinced of the party's error or even corruption, felt duty-bound to
subordinate themselves to the party line. Rousseau stated that where
the qualities of the general will cease to reside in the majority,
"whatever side a man may take, liberty is no longer possible." 66 So,
too, Leon Trotsky, in a speech to the 1924 Party Congress while in
the internal opposition (in Isaac Deutscher's terms, the prophet "un-
armed" but not yet "outcast"), followed his criticism with this strik-
ing concession:
Comrades, none of us wishes to be or can be right against the
party. In the last instance the party is always right, because it is
the only historic instrument which the working class possesses
65. U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/1984/12 Add. 1, at 2.
66. Rousseau, supra note 36, at 250-51 (IV:2).
[Vol. 11:2
CONSTITUTIONALISM IN EASTERN EUROPE
for the solution of its fundamental tasks . . . . One can only be
right with the party and through the party because history has
created no other way for the realization of one's rightness.67
Trotsky, who had as early as 1904 recognized the danger of "substi-
tutism" -- the party's preemption of the role properly belonging to
the working class as a whole" - shortly rediscovered the mistaken-
ness of such exaltation of the party, but his 1924 statement accu-
rately reflects the view of subsequent generations of Communists.
The result of this line of thinking was that collective interests
and the popular will came to be viewed entirely as abstractions.
When the individual was "forced to be free," it was not on the basis
of a will to which the individual equally contributed, a will that re-
flected collective interests as perceived by the people themselves.
Rather, it was on the basis of a metaphorical popular will - the
"6objective" will, as it were, of the working class. And whereas the
freedom was metaphorical, the force was not.
Within this framework, there could be no issue of constitution-
alism in the genuine sense. There was no basis for limiting the power
of the state, for empowering individuals or groups to act in opposi-
tion to the state, or for protecting individuals or groups from arbi-
trary governmental actions. At best, the framework allowed for or-
derly regulation of the exercise of state power and for protection
from the arbitrary acts of renegade functionaries, i.e., for the institu-
tion of rule by law. Law could thereby function to make the lowest
levels of government accountable to the highest, and in particular to
make the bureaucracy accountable to the party. At that point, "so-
cialist legality" reached its conceptual limit.
B. Communist Practices and the Marxian Critique of Rights
It is clear that vanguard rule is irreconcilable with genuine con-
stitutionalism. It has been suggested, however, that the contradiction
between radical communitarianism and constitutionalism lies deeper,
in Marx's critique of liberal rights and of the liberal dichotomy be-
tween political community and civil society.
Martin Krygier has recently argued that the absence of rule of
law under the Eastern and Central European regimes can be traced,
in significant part, to Marx's analysis of the liberal state and civil
society.69 He contends that Marx's tendency to view law's role as
subordinate to social forces and as a mask for ruling class interests
systematically engenders a disrespect for legality:
67. RALPH MILIBAND. MARXISM AND POLITICS 147 (1977).
68. See id. at 124.
69. Martin Krygier, Marxism and the Rule of Law: Reflections After the Collapse of
Communism, 15 LAW & SOCIAL INQUIRY 633 (1990).
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Many of Marx's comments on law seek to unmask it and its
pretensions. As a limit to the power of the powerful it is either
illusory and systematically partial - for law is involved in class
exploitation and repression - or useful to ruling classes as an
ideological emollient and mask for their real social power, a
power which, however well disguised, is fundamental - at least,
Engels came to add after Marx's death, "ultimately," "in the
last analysis." It was necessary, not that law fulfill any mythical
essence, . but that it disappear along with the state, and with
the civil society which supported them and which they
supported.
.. .That [law] might. . . be liberating was only conceded
by Marx in comparison with the feudal past or with worse ver-
sions of the capitalist present, certainly not in comparison with
the socialist and communist future. So to ask Marxist revolut-
ionaries to make space for restraint by the rule of law would be
to voice a quaint liberal demand for which they were not theo-
retically - let alone temperamentally - programmed. 70
It is true - and highly unfortunate - that Marx never had
occasion to deal directly with the question of rule of law (let alone
constitutionalism) in revolutionary society. It is also true that, in
much the way that Rousseau derided the liberal social contract for
enshrining inequality and oppression under the guise of mutual bene-
fit, Marx disparaged "political emancipation" and equal rights as be-
stowing, in essence, a false freedom. But it does not follow that
Marx intended - or would even have found tolerable - the aboli-
tion of rule of law in advance of the abolition of state coercion.
In Marx's conception, rights, like the state itself, ultimately dis-
appear as a result of historical processes, not mere acts of will. In-
deed, even bourgeois economic rights, such as the right to payment
according to one's work, remain and cannot be transcended until the
development of productive forces and "the all-round development of
the individual" make possible the fulfillment of the formula, "[f]rom
each according to his ability, to each according to his needs."'1 It is
thus logical to assume that civil and political rights (corresponding
to the historical circumstances of socialist revolution) cannot be
transcended until all opposing interests, and thus all need for coer-
cion (and therefore for the state), are themselves transcended.
More importantly, for Marx, working class power was not an
abstraction. The "dictatorship of the proletariat" entailed the actual
control by ordinary people of government operations on a day-to-day
basis. 2 Moreover, such control, as Marx described in his extolling.
70. Id. at 651 (footnotes omitted).
71. Marx, Critique of the Gotha Program, in MER, supra note 22, 525, 531.
72. Although Marx intended that communists constitute a "vanguard" in a general
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narrative of the 1871 Paris Commune, was not to be limited to the
workers, but extended to the peasantry as well, notwithstanding the
latter's distinct set of interests:
The rural communes of every district were to administer
their common affairs by an assembly of delegates in the central
town, and these district assemblies were again to send deputies
to the National Delegation in Paris, each delegate to be at any
time revocable and bound by the mandat imperatif (formal in-
structions) of his constituents .... While the merely repressive
organs of the old governmental power were to be amputated, its
legitimate functions were to be wrested from an authority usurp-
ing pre-eminence over society itself, and restored to the responsi-
ble agents of society. Instead of deciding once in three or six
years which member of the ruling class was to misrepresent the
people in Parliament, universal suffrage was to . . . [permit the
people] if they for once make a mistake, to redress it promptly."s
"The Commune," Marx believed, "would have delivered the peasant
of the blood tax - would have given him a cheap government, -
transformed his present blood-suckers, the notary, advocate, execu-
tor, and other judicial vampires, into salaried communal agents,
elected by, and responsible to, himself. '7  To himself literally, it
may be added, not merely metaphorically.
This emphasis on accountability can scarcely be conceived with-
out some notion of rights against the state. And indeed, one finds
nowhere in Marx's critique of the French Declaration of the Rights
of Man and Citizen any attack on the rights of citizens, which in-
cluded the right to "speak, write and publish freely" (Article XI)
and the "right to determine the necessity of the public contribution,
either in person or by their representatives, to consent freely thereto,
to watch over its use, and to determine the amount, base, collection
and duration thereof" (Art. XIV).
True accountability of the state apparatus to the working class
requires that citizens have rights against that apparatus. This fact
was recognized by no less a firebrand Marxist revolutionary than
Rosa Luxemburg, in her criticism of the early course of the Bolshe-
sense, he envisaged it as catalyzing rather than supplanting the decisionmaking activity of the
working class itself. See Marx & Engels, The Manifesto of the Communist Party, in MER,
supra note 22, at 473, 483 (the Communists "do not set up any sectarian principles of their
own, by which to shape and mould the proletarian movement" and "do not form a separate
party"). Id.
73. Marx, The Civil War in France, in MER, supra note 22, at 618, 633. Although
Marx himself never directly characterized the Paris Commune as the fulfillment of his concept
of proletarian dictatorship, Friedrich Engels made statements to this effect, and these have
been imputed to Marx. See SHLOMO AVINERI, THE SOCIAL & POLITICAL THOUGHT OF KARL
MARX 240 (1968).
74. Marx, The Civil War in France, in MER, supra note 22, 618, 637.
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vik revolution:
Freedom only for supporters of the government, only for the
members of the party - however numerous they may be - is
no freedom at all. Freedom is always and exclusively for the one
who thinks differently. Not because of any fanatical concept of
"justice" but because all that is instructive, wholesome and puri-
fying in political freedom depends on this essential characteris-
tic, and its effectiveness vanishes when "freedom" becomes a
special privilege.75
She thus called for "unrestricted freedom of press and assembly,"
and faulted Lenin's failure to allow for "the most unlimited, the
broadest democracy and public opinion.""6 She recognized that in
the absence of pluralism, popular participation is necessarily reduced
to the role of rubber-stamping the leadership's decisions.
Without general elections, without unrestricted freedom of press
and assembly, without a free struggle of opinion, life dies out in
every public institution, becomes a mere semblance of life, in
which only the bureaucracy remains as the active element ....
[What remains is] not the dictatorship of the proletariat ....
but only the dictatorship of a handful of politicians, that is[,] a
dictatorship in the bourgeois sense .... 1
Of course, this is precisely what occurred.
None of this is to deny that Marxian theory made little provi-
sion for constitutionalism, or that the tension in Marxism between
participation and direction, between actual popular control and the
preordained process of social transformation, is real. But it is to deny
that an anticonstitutionalist resolution of that tension follows natu-
rally either from Marxism or from the more general communitarian
precepts (to which Marx substantially contributed) criticizing the
liberal conception of rights and advocating an affirmative role for the
state in the realization of human freedom.
IV. Communitarianism and Constitutionalism
A. Rousseau's Social Contract: A Source of Constitutionalism
If it is taken as established that communitarianism, even in its
radical, Marxian variant, does not necessarily imply the unlimited
state authority inherent in the Communist model, it remains to find
a source of genuine constitutionalist principles consistent with the
basic teachings of communitarianism. A communitarian constitu-
75. ROSE LUXEMBURG, The Russian Revolution, in THE RUSSIAN REVOLUTION AND
LENINISM OR MARXISM? 25, 69 (1981).
76. Id. at 71.
77. Id. at 71-72.
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tionalism must be oriented toward securing the equal exercise of
control by citizens over the decisions that affect their lives, a circum-
stance that presupposes at least a modicum of economic levelling and
material security. Provision must be made for the furtherance of
popular participation and for combatting the undue influence of par-
ticularist interests. While guaranteeing certain rights exercisable
against state authority, a communitarian constitutionalism must re-
ject the notion that rights are fundamentally a bulwark against soci-
ety, existing to shield the zealous pursuit of self-interest. Communi-
tarian rights, though existing independent of and not subordinate to
the state policy of the moment, must carry with them concomitant
duties to use them in the service of the common weal.
The starting point for deriving principles of communitarian con-
stitutionalism is none other than Rousseau's version of the social
contract. Far from being a totalitarian tract, The Social Contract
contains within its own logic the fundamentals of a constitutionalist
order.
Rousseau's citizen, it is true, reserves no rights against the Sov-
ereign, i.e., the united citizenry that articulates the general will. To
take this proposition at face value, however, is to be misled. "[T]he
Sovereign, being formed wholly of the individuals who compose it,
neither has nor can have any interest contrary to theirs. 175 Nor is
the point simply that the Sovereign is incapable of acting against its
members as a whole. The Sovereign is also, once again by definition,
incapable of acting against its members individually. Since "all con-
tinually will the happiness of each one," and every citizens considers
"each" to mean himself, every citizens will vote for the good of the
whole in- consideration of his own good.7 9 This is because "every au-
thentic act of the general will binds or favors all citizens equally; so
that the Sovereign recognizes only the body of the nation, and draws
no distinctions between those of whom- it is made up." 80
This point highlights the crucial difference between the sover-
eign general will and the "will of all," which, though embodying the
majority view, is not sovereign. The Sovereign - in order to have
the qualities of the Sovereign - cannot require more of one subject
than another, for in such a case, the Sovereign's will would be not
general but particular with respect to the individual singled out."1
78. Rousseau, supra note 36, at 176 (1:7). One might satirically - but only satirically
- juxtapose this with Leonid Brezhnev's comments on the Soviet Constitution, discussed
supra.
79. Rousseau, supra note 36, at 186-87 (II:4).
80. Id. at 188 (11:4) (emphasis added).
81. Id. ("the Sovereign never has a right to lay more charges on one subject than on
another, because, in that case, the question becomes particular, and ceases to be within its
competency").
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This distinction between the general will and the will of all sug-
gests a basis for judicial review of majoritarian lawmaking that is
not far removed from familiar "equal protection" jurisprudence.
True, Rousseau did not propose this solution; he proposed no solution
at all. He did, however, make clear that misuse of the legislative
power to the detriment of discrete parts of the citizenry is illegiti-
mate and intolerable. Furthermore, as will be noted shortly, an or-
gan of judicial review that traces its legitimacy to an act of the gen-
eral will does not badly compromise the integrity of Rousseau's
system - certainly not as badly as throwing up one's hands and
saying "whatever side a man may take, liberty is no longer possible"!
Once judicial review of legislation on equal protection grounds
is conceded as a possibility, the floodgates open. First, any issue aris-
ing under the ordinary panoply of liberal negative rights can be
reconstrued as an equal protection issue in this Rousseauian sense,
since the effects of denial of these rights will burden discrete groups
disproportionately. While virtually all legislation has disparate ef-
fects, the will of the majority is most prone to be "particular" wher-
ever these rights are disregarded: censorship discriminates against
the holders of certain opinions; unreasonable searches and seizures
discriminate against the targets of police investigations; denial of fair
criminal procedures discriminates against criminal suspects; and
cruel and unusual punishments discriminate against prisoners. Bur-
dens on these rights pass muster only where one can plausibly will
them in contemplation of being oneself subject to them. (Herein lies
a link between the Rousseauian general will and the Kantian cate-
gorical imperative, which dictates that an act can be morally legiti-
mate only if it embodies a maxim that can be willed universally;
fittingly, Kantian moral philosophy is a touchstone of German com-
munitarian jurisprudence.) 82
Second, the Sovereign cannot - again, in order to have the
qualities of the Sovereign - enact a law that would impair the abil-
ity of the general will to be formed. For example, despite Rousseau's
clear support for censorship, 83 such censorship could not be allowed
to impinge on the wide-ranging deliberations leading to the proper
formation of the general will, since the citizens, willing always that
the general will should prevail, could not will the general will's de-
82. See IMMANUEL KANT, GROUNDWORK OF THE METAPHYSIC OF MORALS 88 (52)
(H.J. Paton trans. 1964) ("'Act as if the maxim of your action were to become through your
will a universal law of nature' ") (emphasis in original). The first article of the German Basic
Law (Grundgesetz) references the Kantian moral concept of human dignity. Kant is taken
quite seriously by German jurists and legal scholars. See generally DONALD P. KoMMERs, THE
CONSTITUTIONAL JURISPRUDENCE OF THE FEDERAL REPUBLIC OF GERMANY 38-39, 47, 308-09,
312-14 (1989).
83. Rousseau, supra note 36, at 266-68 (IV:7).
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generation.8 (On the other hand, the opinion that the general will
itself should not prevail can never form part of the general will, and
this view can be excluded - essentially the position taken by the
German constitutional doctrine of "militant democracy.") 8 5 Political
rights, and civil rights that affect them, are thus logically inferred.
Constitutionalism is further inherent in Rousseau's conception
of the division of powers and functions. Although the Sovereign can-
not have any interest contrary to that of the people, the same is not
true of the government. In Rousseau's terminology, the "Sovereign"
refers to the legislative power, which in a "republic" is made up of
the whole people and legislates according to the general will. The
"government" refers to the executive power. Whereas the Sovereign
represents the will of the body politic, the government represents the
force.8 6 A republican government may take the form of a "democ-
racy," an "aristocracy" or even a "monarchy"; these three are
merely different modes of administration, each appropriate to cer-
tain circumstances, but each, in a republic, responsive to the general
will. 7 Each form, however, is prone to abuse, resulting in "ochloc-
racy," "oligarchy," or "tyranny. ' 88 Such abuse occurs when the
government
ceases to administer the State in accordance with the laws, and
usurps the Sovereign power. A remarkable change than occurs:
not the government, but the State, undergoes contraction; I
mean that the great State is dissolved, and another is formed
within it, composed solely of the members of the government,
which becomes for the rest of the people merely master and ty-
rant. So that the moment the government usurps the Sover-
eignty, the social compact is broken, and all citizens recover by
84. Some commentators have emphasized Rousseau's call for the citizens to have "no
communication with one another" in arriving at their decisions, id. at 185 (11:3), so that they
will not "imbib[e] the collective opinions of [their] neighbors in a public assembly." See Rob-
ert Wokler, Rousseau's Two Concepts of Liberty, in LIVEs, LIBERTIES, AND THE PUBLIC GOOD
61, 85 (G. Feaver & F. Rosen eds. 1987). Although this interpretation might seem to depre-
cate the need for open debate, Rousseau's insistence in the same passage on the people "being
furnished with adequate information" suggests to the contemporary reader the practical need
for such debate. Moreover, the warning against communication arises in the context of the
condemnation of "intrigues" and "partial associations formed at the expense of the great asso-
ciation"; it is hardly clear that it applies to the airing of opinions within the great association
itself.
85. See Kommers, supra note 82, at 222-44.
86. Rousseau, supra note 36, at 208 (111:1).
87. Id at 193 & n.1 (11:6). An interesting (and rare) point of departure of Marx's other-
wise largely Rousseauian vision of a participatory dictatorship of the proletariat is the confla-
tion of the executive and legislative functions. Marx, The Civil War in France, in MER supra,
618, 632 ("The Commune was to be a working, not a parliamentary, body, executive and
legislative at the same time"). Marx's discussion of 1871 Paris was as much descriptive as
prescriptive, however, and is in any event difficult to take seriously as a practical matter. Rous-
seau himself seems generally to have preferred that the executive function be fulfilled by "elec-
tive aristocracy." Rousseau, supra 215-25 (111:3-6).
88. Rousseau, supra note 36, at 234 (111:10).
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right their natural liberty, and are forced, but not bound, to
obey. 89
As to the legislator, any suggestion that Rousseau authorized a
Leninist-style vanguard to impose the transformative blueprint is
sharply refuted by his insistence that whatever the legislator's moral
authority, "only the general will can bind the individuals, and there
can be no assurance that a particular will is in conformity with the
general will, until it has been put to the free vote of the people."
Rousseau placed special emphasis on this point: "This I have said
already; but it is worth while to repeat it." He warned that Rome
"suffered a revival of all the crimes of tyranny, and was brought to
the verge of destruction, because it put the legislative [drafting] au-
thority and the sovereign power into the same hands." If the legisla-
tor were to have unilateral authority, "his private aims would inevi-
tably mar the sanctity of his work." 90
It is conceivable that a constitutional court, like the legislator,
would be limited in a Rousseauian system to the role of moralsua-
sion, as are such courts in countries (e.g., Canada) that retain the
tradition of parliamentary supremacy. Yet it does not seem illogical
that the general will could authorize a body of individuals, not to
pre-empt the Sovereign's lawmaking function, but to strike down
laws that do not emanate from a truly general will, and thus that do
not actually emanate from the Sovereign. Such a body might even be
able, within some limit, to force the body politic to take action where
inaction itself bespeaks the triumph of a particular over the general
will. Herein lies a tension, and perhaps a slippery slope, but this con-
ception of judicial review does not seem logically inconsistent with
The Social Contract, and is clearly more consistent with it than is
unbridled majoritarianism or vanguard rule.
Rousseau's Social Contract thus embodies a basis for constitu-
tionalism alternative to that emanating from the Lockean tradition.
It illustrates that the idea of a strong, activist state, empowered to
exact wide-ranging (and perhaps sharply redistributive) contribu-
tions from individuals to the commonweal, is theoretically consistent
with limitations on the arbitrary exercise of state power.
Individual rights in this context are not "natural" rights, i.e.,
preservations of pre-social liberty of self-interest subject to no con-
comitant obligations beyond recognition of the similar rights of
others. Nor are they, on the other hand, rights as conceived in the
Soviet bloc constitutions, bestowed upon individuals by the govern-
89. Id. at 233 (111:10).
90. Id. at 195-96 (11:7). There is no indication that Marx thought any differently on this
point. See Marx & Engels, The Manifesto of the Communist Party, in MER, supra note 22,
473 at 483 (discussed supra).
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ment as an extension of state policy - rights therefore assertable
only in the context of and consistent with whatever state policy hap-
pens to be at any given moment, and so never actually assertable
against the government. Rather, communitarian rights constitute a
third type of right, derived from the transcendent logic of democratic
community, founded, as it were, "on the relations between man and
man" rather than upon "the separation of man from man." Such
rights are assertable, not against the true social whole, but against
the state whenever the state deviates from the general will.
B. Communitarianism in West German Constitutional
Jurisprudence
There are no obvious real-world examples of a constitutional ju-
risprudence based fully on the principles articulated above. These
principles find resonance, however, in the constitutional jurispru-
dence of the Federal Republic of Germany (FRG).
The 1949 Grundgesetz (Basic Law) reflects the influence of
postwar West Germany's most important political parties, the Chris-
tian Democrats and the Social Democrats. Each adhered to a syn-
thesis of liberal and communitarian ideology, the communitarian
component of Christian Democracy being a progressive adaptation of
authoritarian-corporatist communitarianism, and that of Social De-
mocracy being an attenuated Marxian socialism. These parties,
along with the liberal Free Democrats, erected a constitutional order
based on four fundamental principles: Rechtsstaat (rule-of-law
state), Sozialstaat (social welfare state), Parteienstaat (political
party state), and streitbare Demokratie (militant democracy). Al-
though the Grundgesetz is in many respects a liberal document, all
four principles have unmistakably communitarian components.
The expanse of the Rechtsstaat conception is reflected in Article
1 (1), the pinnacle of the Basic Law's hierarchy of values: "The dig-
nity of man shall be inviolable. To respect and protect it shall be the
.duty of all state authority." This self-executing provision not only
limits the state, but calls upon the state to intervene in civil society
to prevent individuals from being treated in dehumanizing ways. The
Constitutional Court has gone so far as to hold, for example, that
because the constitution conceives "man as an autonomous person
who freely develops within the social community," the state has an
obligation to protect the "individual's right to societal respect and
esteem," even at the expense of others' free expression. 9'
Donald Kommers explains that the Constitutional Court's
91. Mephisto Case, 30 BVerfGE 173 (1971), excerpted in Kommers, supra note 82, at
309-12.
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jurisprudence
envisions society as more than a collection of individuals moved
by self-interest, calculation, or the manipulation of others. The
Constitutional Court has never interpreted the human dignity
clause as a vindication of autonomous individualism. It defends
freedom as individual self-determination but attaches nearly
equal weight to the social values of participation, communica-
tion, and civility. Human dignity, in the eyes of the Constitu-
tional Court, requires a caring and sharing society marked by
understanding and reciprocity among individuals in the presence
of definite values.
92
Although Rechtsstaat stresses individual rights, it recognizes as
a limitation the traditional continental concept of "abuse of rights";
rights carry with them an obligation to use them properly, in keeping
with responsibilities to others and to society. Duties, no less than
rights, are fundamental to the jurisprudence. The "Basic Rights"
enumerated in the Grundgesetz, though safeguarding the sphere of
the individual, have a distinctly social flavor.
Sozialstaat recognizes the activist role of the state in establish-
ing a just social order in which individuals are guaranteed the essen-
tial material prerequisites to human freedom, such as work, housing
and health care.93 The Grundgesetz does not decree any particular
model of economic organization, but expressly permits transfer to
public ownership of land, natural resources, and means of production
"for the purpose of socialization" (Article 15). It guarantees prop-
erty and the right of inheritance, but with the qualification that
"[t]heir content and limits shall be determined by the law" (Art.
14(1)). Most strikingly un-Lockean is Article 14(2): "Property im-
poses duties. Its use should also serve the public weal." Expropria-
tion does not necessarily require full compensation, but compensa-
tion determined on the basis of "an equitable balance between the
public interest and the interests of those affected" (Art. 14(3)). The
state's redistributive function, though not compelled, is specifically
empowered.
The German Constitutional Court recognizes that property's
"function is to secure its holder a sphere of liberty in the economic
field and thereby enable him to lead a self-governing life," to enjoy
92. Kommers, supra note 82, at 313.
93. Kommers, supra note 82, at 248, 559 n.5, citing, inter alia, Employment Agency
Case, 21 BVerfGE 245, 251 (1967) (work); Tenant Security Case, 18 BVerfGE 121, 132
(1964) (housing); Muhiheim-Karlich Case, 36 BVerfGE 237, 245 (1973) (state's obligation to
promote and safeguard citizens' health). The Grundgesetz does not, however, specifically enu-
merate economic and social rights. As Kommers notes, the constitution is used less to compel
legislation in these areas than to justify such legislation, which in Germany has been very
substantial. Id. at 248-49.
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"the realm of freedom within which persons engage in self-defining,
responsible activity."94 Property is much more a right of self-deter-
mination and self-definition than of self-interest:
The image of, man in the Basic Law is not that of an isolated,
sovereign individual. On the contrary, the Basic Law has re-
solved the tension between the individual and society in favor of
coordination and interdependence with the community without
touching the intrinsic value of the person . . . . The individual
has to accept those limits on his freedom of action which the
legislature imposes to cultivate and maintain society. 95
Thus, the state can, for example, compel contributions from some
sector of industry to subsidize others,98 and require substantial em-
ployee participation in the governance of private sector enterprises.97
The goal of Parteienstaat is to preserve the essence of the Rous-
seauian process of general will formation, notwithstanding the im-
practicability of the unmediated popular participation envisaged in
The Social Contract. Andrzej Rapaczynski has concisely described
the continental European conception of parliamentarism as follows:
[Representation is understood] quite literally, as a faithful re-
flection (re-presentation) of the constellation of political forces
in society. Social groups sharing a common interest or agreeing
on a vision of the public interest should be able to organize in
political parties of their own . . . . The legislature would then
constitute a microcosm of society; each significant social group
would have its own voice . . . . Only when the parliament con-
tains all the essential ideological ingredients that make up the
nation as a whole is the soul of the people present in its
pronouncements. 8
It is on this basis that the Grundgesetz officially establishes the role
of political parties "in forming the political will of the people" (Art.
21(1)). 9-
94. Hamburg Flood Control Case, 24 BVerfGE 367 (1968), excerpted in Kommers,
supra note 82, at 257-59.
95. Investment Aid Case 1, 4 BVerfGE 7 91954), excerpted in Kommers, supra, note
82, at 250.
96. Id. at 249-52.
97. Codetermination Case, 50 BVerfGE 290 (1979), excerpted in Kommers, supra note
82, at 278-82.
98. Rapaczynski, supra note 1, at 617. Rapaczynski contrasts this vision with the liberal
view of democracy "as a purely negative device, allowing the voters to cashier a government
that they perceive is not doing its job." Id. at 618.
99. The Constitutional Court has noted that previous German constitutions "refused to
recognize groups mediating between the free individual and the will of the entire people com-
posed of the sum of individual wills and represented in parliament by parliamentarians 'as
representatives of the entire people.' " Socialist Reich Party Case, 2 BVerfGE 1 (1952), ex-
cerpted in Kommers, supra note 82, at 223. That prior view reflects Rousseau's warning
against "partial associations."
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The constitution itself regulates political parties, requiring that
"[their internal organization must conform to democratic princi-
ples," that "[t]hey must publicly account for the sources and use of
their funds and assets," and that they not "seek to impair or abolish
the free democratic basic order" (Art. 21(1), (2)). It is a constitu-
tional concern that the parties obtain appropriate amounts of free air
time,1"' state financing,101 and most interestingly, representation on
all parliamentary committees. 102 This last ensures
that all [legislative] decisions will be [truly] representative in
nature and reflect the totality of the people's [will]. It is pre-
cisely this general participation in the formation of the political
will of parliament - a process emanating from general intellec-
tual and political discussion and argumentation - which legiti-
mates the inherent right.of a parliamentary majority to decide
[issues of public policy]. 03
Consistent with this principle, the Federal Constitutional Court, in
which is concentrated all power to review the constitutionality of leg-
islation, is chosen by parliament through a process calculated to
guarantee that the Court reflects the ideological spectrum.10 4
"Militant democracy" reflects the values inherent in Parteien-
staat. The Constitutional Court is vested (in Article 21(2)) with the
power to ban parties "which, by reason of their aims or the behavior
of their adherents, seek to impair or abolish the free democratic ba-
sic order or to endanger the existence" of the nation. The Court used
this power in 1952 to ban a neo-Nazi party and in 1956 to ban the
Communisfs.1 °5 Interestingly, in the former case, the ban was justi-
fied in part on the basis of the party's internal structure:
In brief, a party must be structured from the bottom up; that is,
members must not be excluded from decision-making processes,
and the basic equality of members as well as the freedom to join
or to leave [the party] must be guaranteed. It would also contra-
vene democratic principles . either to promise absolute obedi-
ence to party leaders or to demand such a promise. 06
100. West German Media Case, 14 BVerfGE 121 (1962), excerpted in Kommers, supra
note 82, at 218-22.
101. Party Finance Case I, 20 BVerfGE 56 (1966), excerpted in Kommers, supra note
82, at 205-10.
102. Green Party Exclusion Case, 70 BVerfGE 324 (1986), excerpted in Kommers,
supra note 82, at 175-79.
103. Id. at 177-78 (Bochenforde, J., dissenting).
104. See Kommers, supra note 82, at 24-26. Justices are appointed for a single fixed
term of twelve years.
105. Socialist Reich Party Case, 2 BVerfGE 1 (1952), excerpted in Kommers, supra
note 82, at 223-27; Communist Party Case, 5 BVerfGE 85 (1956), quoted in Kommers, supra
at 227-29.
106. Socialist Reich Party Case, supra note 104, at 225.
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Militant democracy has thus extended to protecting the process of
general will formation from internally-undemocratic partial associa-
tions. Additionally, Article 18 provides for forfeiture of a wide range
of constitutional rights if those rights are abused "in order to combat
the free democratic basic order."
The Grundgesetz thus does not embody the liberal conception of
the limited, neutral state, existing to secure the freedom of the indi-
vidual to pursue self-interest. There is an unmistakable sense of the
state's affirmative social project, and of freedom as realizable
through the social whole, rather than being based primarily on pro-
tection from the social whole.
It is therefore noteworthy that the German constitution includes
a doctrine for the protection of the individual more expansive than
any contained in the United States Constitution: the right to the free
development of the personality. This doctrine is not an exception to
the German constitution's communitarianism, but a fundamental as-
pect of it.
Article 2(1) of the Grundgesetz provides as follows: "Everyone
shall have the right to the free development of his personality insofar
as he does not violate the rights of others or offend against the con-
stitutional order or the moral code." The concept is not properly
characterized as a right to privacy, at least not as understood in
American constitutional doctrine or in Lockean theory; it is more
limited, yet at the same time broader. The Court has stated:
The term "free development of personality" cannot simply
mean development within that central area of personality that
essentially defines a human person as a spiritual-moral being
[i.e., the Kernbereichstheorie], for it is inconceivable how devel-
opment within this core area could offend the moral code, the
rights of others, or even the constitutional order of a free democ-
racy. Rather, the limitations imposed on the individual as a
member of the political community show that the freedom of
action [implicit] in Article 2(1) is to be broadly construed. 07
The Grundgesetz has "erected a value-oriented order that . . . guar-
antees the independence, self-determination, and dignity of man
within the political community."' 0 8
The notion of free development of personality emanates from
the very purpose of the communitarian project - to construct a
form of societal organization that permits the individual, in Rous-
seau's words, "to obey himself alone." As discussed above, Marx
maintained that "free, conscious activity is man's species character,"
107. Elfes Case, 6 BVerfGE 32 (1957), excerpted in Kommers, supra note 82, at 324,
325-26.
108. Id. at 327.
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from which man in liberal-individualist society is estranged; 10 9 the
very goal of social transformation is ultimately to transcend the
"realm of necessity," beyond which "begins that development of
human energy which is an end in itself, the true realm of freedom
.... "110 This intellectual tradition strives, much more boldly than
does the liberal tradition, to make the human being the subject, not
the object, of social life. That it does so, paradoxically, by burdening
the individual with seemingly all-encompassing societal obligations
does not negate the point.
Yet this paradox threatens the integrity of the communitarian
project. If the paradox cannot be resolved within the internal logic of
communitarianism, then communitarianism can scarcely evade the
judgment that it is the road to hell, paved with good intentions.
A resolution of this paradox can be found in the observation
that excessive encroachments on the individual impede the develop-
ment of human sociality, on which the perfection of the common
project depends. The freedom of all and the freedom of the one are
intrinsically linked. A healthy society requires healthy individuals,
and vice versa. When the encroachment of society upon the individ-
ual causes the individual to withdraw from full participation in soci-
ety - to put up a facade of participation while withholding his true
energies from the social project and guarding his true opinions from
his fellows - society is weakened and the will of all is rendered less
general. Cynicism develops toward the social project, encouraging
attempts to distort that project to the advantage of "particular" in-
terests, and the body politic, with reduced active participation, is less
able to resist. Thus, laws and state practices that encroach too heav-
ily upon the individual are destructive of the community and of the
general will.
This proposition is not a mere theoretical musing. Its truth is
established by the recent experiences of Eastern Europe. The more
the sphere of the individual was disrespected, the less social spirit
was exhibited by the citizenry. The greater the demands for utter
selflessness, the more ingenious the devices by which individuals con-
trived to withhold their contribution; the less respect for privacy, the
less truth-telling. Most corrupting of all was the pervasive presence,
real and imagined, of the secret police in social life, causing individ-
uals to regard one another with suspicion and to withdraw to the
private sphere.
Consistent with the Basic Law's communitarian bent, the Ger-
man Constitutional Court has justified its "free development of per-
109. Marx, Economic and Philosophic Manuscripts of 1844, in MER, supra note 22, at
76.
110. Marx, Capital, Vol. III, in MER, supra note 22, at 441.
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sonality" jurisprudence in just these terms. Thus:
If [an individual] expects that [the state] will officially register
his attendance at a meeting or participation in a citizens' initia-
tive and [believes] personal risks might result from this, this per-
son may refrain from exercising his rights [of association] (Arti-
cles 8 and 9). This would not only impair his chances of
development but would also damage the common good, because
self-determination is an elementary functional condition of a
free democratic community based on its citizens' capacity to act
and to participate.11 1
Free development of personality is therefore held to require, in-
ter alia, "informational self-determination." "An individual's right
to plan and make decisions freely [and] without pressure or influence
from others is crucially inhibited if he cannot predict with sufficient
certainty what personal information [the state] Will release in a
given area of his social environment.""'  The emphasis on the impor-
tance of social relationships makes all the more pressing the individ-
ual's need for reassurance that his public persona is subject to his
own control. "An individual has the right to determine," for exam-
ple, "whether he wants to restrict his utterances solely to his conver-
sational partner or to a certain group, or whether he wants to publi-
cize his remarks."1"3 Free development of personality entails "the
right to a private, secret, intimate sphere of life, . . . to personal
honor and the rightful portrayal of one's own person, . . . to one's
image and spoken word, . . . and under certain circumstances, the
right not to have statements falsely attributed to oneself .... ."I",
These rights are exercisable against other individuals, as well as
against the state.
The more one understands this concept as linked to the un-
hindered development of the individual's sociality, the broader its po-
tential implications. The doctrine transcends the formal barrier sepa-
rating public and private life; it protects the sanctity of certain
human interactions precisely because they are social.
The constitutional jurisprudence of the FRG has demonstrated
that communitarian principles, far from being inimical to constitu-
tionalism, contribute in important ways to the bolstering of protec-
111. Census Act Case, 65 BVerfGE 1 (1983), excerpted in Kommers, supra note 82, at
332, 334 (emphasis added); cf. NAACP v. Alabama, 357 U.S. 449 (1958) (protecting the
membership lists of advocacy groups).
112. Census Act Case. supra note 111, at 334 (emphasis added).
113. Eppler Case, 54 BVerfGE 148 (1980), excerpted in Kommers, supra note 82, at
329, 331; see also Tape Recording Case II, 34 BVerfGE 238 (1973) (barring admissibility of
a conversation secretly taped by the other party, on the ground that the information conveyed
related to the private sphere of the individual's personality), summarized in Kommers, supra
note 82, at 340-41.
114. Id. at 330.
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tions for the individual. The West German experience provides a
model of constitutionalism for states that, rather than proceeding on
Lockean premises, take it upon themselves to fulfill a broader social
function. Much more than the liberal U.S. model, the FRG model
lends itself to Eastern and Central European adaptations that may
be inspired by more radical communitarian visions.
C. Toward a More Expansively Communitarian Constitutional-
ism: The 1990 GDR Round Table Draft
The Grundgesetz and the jurisprudence thereunder inspired a
short-lived but significant constitutional project in the German Dem-
ocratic Republic (GDR) in the period of dramatic reforms following
the fall of the Berlin Wall and prior to the electoral victory of the
unificationist forces. Reform-minded Communists and the demo-
cratic socialist-oriented dissident movement, negotiating in the so-
called "Round Table Talks," turned for advice and expertise to con-
stitutional scholars and jurists associated with the West German So-
cial Democratic and Green parties.115 The result was a constitutional
draft, completed (already too late) in April 1990, that expanded on
the communitarian aspects of the Grundgesetz.
Predictably, the Round Table Draft, in contrast to the vague
references to Sozialstaat found in Articles 20 and 28 of the
Grundgesetz, specifically constitutionalized the state's social welfare
obligations. The Draft included a right to full social security benefits
in the event of sickness, accident, disability, handicap, inability to
care for oneself, old age, and unemployment (Art. 23(2)), to appro-
priate housing (Art. 25), to employment or assistance in securing
employment (Art. 27(1)), and to day care (Art. 24(3))."16 Equal ac-
cess to education and a minimum of ten years of public schooling
were to be guaranteed (Art. 24). Environmental protection was elab-
orately raised to the level of a constitutional obligation, governing
both state and private action (Art. 33).
The Draft's property protections were even more detailed and
qualified than those of the Grundgesetz, with differential protections
based on property qualifications. Property for personal use and prop-
erty of collectives were to be privileged, being subject to full com-
pensation upon expropriation (as is the actual practice in the FRG),
whereas compensation for other forms of property was to be suscep-
tible to the same "balancing of interests of the community and those
115. Peter E. Quint, The Constitutional Law of German Unification, 50 MD. L. REV.
475, 493-495, 495 n.65 (1991).
116. Id. at 495-497, summarizing the Draft as published in Arbeitsgruppe "Neue
Verfassung der DDR" des Runden Tisches, Verfassungsentwurf fur die DDR (1990). This
summary is the source of all Draft citations infra. My thanks are due to Veselin Scekic for
interpreting the German text and confirming my inferences as to its spirit.
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involved" (Art. 29) allowed for in Article 14(3) of the Grundgesetz.
Formally speaking, then, the Draft's differential standards provided
more protection for property than does the single balancing provision
found in the Grundgesetz, but the practical consequence of differen-
tial protection would almost certainly have been to reduce protection
of private ownership of productive property.
Moreover, whereas Article 15 of the Grundgesetz, discussing so-
cialization of land, natural resources and means of production, has
been interpreted as leaving the matter entirely to the legislature," 7
the Draft reserved holdings of agricultural or forest land exceeding
100 hectares (approximately 250 acres) to collectives, public institu-
tions, and churches (Art. 32(1)). Land use planning was also consti-
tutionalized, with property owners obliged to compensate local gov-
ernment for the value of favorable zoning changes by conveying to
the government a portion of the property (Art. 32(2)). The Draft
defended Communist-era expropriations, except insofar as they had
been carried out in violation of then-existing GDR law (Art. 131).
On the whole, the Draft appears to have conceptualized private
ownership of productive property as qualitatively (though not neces-
sarily quantitatively) secondary and exceptional rather than primary
and fundamental; far from the state existing to secure private prop-
erty relations, private (productive) property was to exist as a condi-
tioned delegation of the state's rightful function. The neutrality of
the Grundgesetz toward patterns of ownership was to be replaced,
not by doctrinaire socialism, but by an orientation that regarded as
natural the overarching role of the state and other collective institu-
tions in the economy.
In the realm of participatory rights, the Round Table Draft ex-
panded upon West German practices. Like Article 21 of the
Grundgesetz, the Draft guaranteed democracy within political par-
ties (Art. 37(2)), but extended the guarantee further to provide for
democracy within associations (Art. 36(2)) and unions (Art. 39(3)).
The Draft followed the jurisprudence of the FRG's Constitutional
Court in extending certain free speech rights to the workplace (Art.
15(1)).118 It went beyond that jurisprudence, however, by constitu-
tionalizing the right of employees to "co-determination," i.e., partici-
117. Volkswagen Denationalization Case, 12 BVerfGE 354 (1961) ("one cannot deduce
a 'tendency toward socialization' from Article 15, meaning that the legislature, if it wants to
regulate property conditions in branches of the economy that may be socialized, can do so only
in the direction toward socialization"), excerpted in Kommers, supra note 82, at 254, 256.
118. Cf. Lockout Case, 38 BVerfGE 386 (1975) (condemning an employer's refusal to
reinstate strike organizers as a violation of the right to associate for the improvement of work-
ing and economic conditions), and IG-Metall Case, 42 BVerfGE 133 (1976) (upholding a
constitutional right to distribute poliiical handbills in the workplace as part and parcel of the
right to organize to improve working conditions), summarized in Kommers, supra note 76, at
283-84.
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pation in the governance of firms (Art. 28).119 The Draft also tran-
scended.'Parteienstaat by granting special constitutional protections
to grass-roots citizens' movements (Art. 35), by providing every citi-
zen the right to be heard regarding decisions to construct power
plants and other large projects (Art. 21(4)), and by allowing for law-
making by referendum (Art. 98). The Draft thus embodied a .broad
conception of popular empowerment.
While more decisively communitarian than the Grundgesetz on
social welfare and popular participation issues, the Round Table
Draft not only retained but amplified the strong protections for the
individual inherent in West German human dignity and free devel-
opment of personality jurisprudence. Reflecting both the traditional
West German concerns about data collection120 and the special con-
cerns arising from East German secret police files, the Draft guaran-
teed each individual the right to examine his file, as well as a quali-
fied right to object to and thereby enjoin data collection (Art. 8(2)).
Both the death penalty, which is expressly barred in Article 102 of
the Grundgesetz, and life imprisonment, which has been limited by
the FRG Constitutional Court, 21 were to be prohibited (Art. 12(5)),
and no extraditions were to be permitted where they might lead to
capital proceedings (Art. 7(2)).
The Draft introduced novel rights, such as a right against medi-
cal experimentation without consent and a right to die in dignity
(Art. 4(1), (2)), and barred discrimination against non-traditional
families or "living communities" (Art. 22(2)). Perhaps most interest-
ingly, the Draft eschewed the FRG Constitutional Court's communi-
tarian imposition of a "duty to carry the pregnancy to term," '22 ex-
pressly guaranteeing women the right to determine whether or not to
be pregnant (Art. 4(3)).
119. Compare Codetermination Case, 50 BVerfGE 290 (1979) (allowing rather than
compelling the legislature to impose this on private employers), excerpted in Kommers, supra
note 82, at 278-82.
120. See Microcensus Case, 27 BVerfGE 1 (1969) (recognizing that an overintrusive
census would constitute a violation of human dignity and of the "inner sphere" essential to the
"free and responsible development" of personality), Census Act Case, 65 BVerfGE 1 (1983)
(striking down parts of census legislation that created a possibility that information shared
among governmental entities could be used to construct personality profiles of particular indi-
viduals), and Divorce Records Case, 27 BVerfGE 344 (1970) (enjoining transmittal of a civil
servant's divorce court records to an administrative disciplinary body), excerpted in Kommers,
supra note 82, at 306-09, 332-40.
121. Life Imprisonment Case, 45 BVerfGE 187 (1977) (life imprisonment permissible
only "when the prisoner is given a concrete and realistically attainable chance to regain his
freedom at some later point in time; the state strikes at the very heart of human dignity if [it]
treats the prisoner without regard to the development of his personality and strips him of all
hope of every earning his freedom"), excerpted in Kommers, supra note 82, at 314-20.
122. Abortion Case, 39 BVerfGE 1 (1975), excerpted in Kommers, supra note 82, at
348-59. The Court deemed the legislature constitutionally compelled to criminalize abortion,
although its intricate balancing analysis allowed for exceptions recognizing the woman's right
not to be forced to sacrifice her own values beyond reasonable expectations. Id. at 356.
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Individual rights nonetheless continued to be expressly subordi-
nated to certain community interests. For example, the Draft sub-
jected free speech, a right already expressly qualified in the
Grundgesetz,1 3 to the additional restriction that "war propaganda as
well as the public declaration of discrimination -that injures human
dignity is to be prohibited by law" (Art. 15(3))." '
The GDR Round Table Draft presented a viable alternative to
the classical liberal model of constitutionalism. While responsive to
liberal concerns and influenced to no small extent by liberal thought,
it embodied a conception of the role of the state that differs funda-
mentally from the classical liberal model. Drawing from East Ger-
man socialist values and from West German constitutional jurispru-
dence, the Draft limited the power of governmental entities without
limiting the mission of governance. It recognized a sphere of individ-
ual self-determination without enshrining the pursuit of self-interest,
and emphasized the role of the individual as citizen, a contributor to
collective decisionmaking not just in the electoral process, but in so-
cial life more broadly. In short, it was a model of communitarian
constitutionalism.
It is true that, other than perhaps in the state of Brandenburg
(where the Draft is reported to have been taken seriously in the pro-
cess of drafting a new state constitution), 25 the political forces be-
hind the Round Table Draft were dealt a severe defeat in the 1990
German elections. It is not clear that this defeat is permanent, how-
ever. German unification has raised the possibility that a new, all-
German constitution will be prepared to replace the Grundgesetz, in
which case the Draft may play a role in the constitutional debates;1 26
a rise in the left's political fortunes in the mean time is not out of the
question. Moreover, the Draft has the potential to be influential far-
ther to the East, where the Draft's embodiment of ingrained socialist
values, combined with its links to the highly reputable FRG constitu-
tional model, may give it currency. In any event, the notorious un-
predictability of economic and political developments in the region
assure that its influence cannot be written off.
123. Article 5(2) of the Grundgesetz states that the right is "limited by the provisions of
the general laws, the provisions of law for protection of youth, and by the right to inviolability
of personal honor." "General laws" refer "not only to laws that 'do not prohibit an opinion or
the expression of an opinion as such' but also to those that 'are directed toward the protection
of legal rights which need protection regardless of any specific opinion'; in other words, laws
that are directed toward the protection of a community value take precedence over the exercise
of free speech." Luth Case, 7 BVerfGE 198 (1958), excerpted in Kommers, supra note 82, at
368, 373. Moreover, Article 18 prohibits abuse of the right "to combat the free democratic
basic order."
124. This provision is based on Article 20 of the International Covenant on Civil and
Political Rights.
125. Quint, supra note 115, at 495 n.67.
126. Id. at 495.
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V. Conclusion
Notwithstanding the apparent triumph of liberal forces, consti-
tutionalism in Eastern and Central Europe should not automatically
be expected to take a purely or even predominantly liberal form. The
deep-seated traditions of much of the region are more consistent
with a communitarian ideological framework that asserts a strong
state role in patterning social and economic affairs, and that envis-
ages the individual not as autonomous, but as bound up with the
social whole. This framework should not be written off as anticonsti-
tutionalist, despite the past association of communitarian ideas with
the unlimited exercise of state power. Rather, communitarianism,
even in a radical form, should be seen as a potential basis for the
creation of a constitutional structure capable of restraining the exer-
cise of state power and maintaining respect for the individual within
the social context.
Some constitutional scholars currently involved in the Eastern
and Central European efforts to draft new constitutions and to
ground constitutional jurisprudence may well dismiss the foregoing
analysis as a nostalgic exercise, not so much wrong as anachronistic
and irrelevant. To revisit the wellsprings of the radical communitar-
ian vision, and particularly to highlight a defunct state's effort to
extend the communitarian aspects of German constitutional jurispru-
dence in the service of that vision, may strike them as detached from
both political and economic reality. After all, the conventional wis-
dom asserts that even the existing pockets of resistance to free-mar-
ket liberalism, such as Slovakia, will soon be forced to concede that
the vision is not economically viable.
One version of this conventional wisdom asserts that any ap-
proach along the lines of the one suggested by this article, however
logically coherent and morally attractive, is just the opposite of what
is needed. Rather, the argument goes, the new constitutionalism
should serve as a free-market "precommitment strategy." Such a
strategy would provide the strongest possible protections of property
and contractual rights so as to bolster the confidence of foreign in-
vestors and domestic entrepreneurs, and would eschew affirmative
social-welfare rights that obligate the legislature to interfere in mar-
kets. The new constitutions, it is asserted, should be fashioned to
help the free-market reform project withstand the deterioration of
popular support anticipated to result from the project's harsh initial
dislocations. 127
127. This view, which typifies much of the current thinking, was recently articulated by
Cass Sunstein at the January 1993 conference of the Association of American Law Schools. It
is noteworthy that Professor Sunstein expressly limits his invocation of these hard-line princi-
ples to the Eastern European project; nuanced liberalism is fine for the West, but classical
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There are two reasons for regarding this currently-fashionable
approach as short-sighted. First, it is based on an economic theory
that, though exuberantly held, is quite untested. For the majority of
the people affected, the short-run pain of "shock therapy" is certain,
but the long-run gain is not. It is not clear what precedent recom-
mends the insertion of backward economies into a highly sophisti-
cated world market without strong state intervention on behalf of the
weak sectors. There is no guarantee that inequality and insecurity
will serve, in the absence of other propitious circumstances, as the
motors of ingenuity and productivity. Moreover, there is an unmis-
takable dogmatism in attributing the former regimes' economic fail-
ures to the socialist ideals that those regimes only occasionally up-
held, rather than to the evident lack of democratic accountability,
which permitted sclerotic bureaucracy, unprincipled resource alloca-
tion and unjustifiable military spending. Irresistible though the free-
market initiatives may appear at the moment, competing approaches
should not be discounted indefinitely.
Second, even if one accepts the free-market premise, there is no
reason to believe that the legitimacy of a classical liberal constitution
will outlast the popularity of laissez-faire economic policies. A con-
stitution so greatly at variance with the region's traditions will likely,
in times of economic crisis, be seen as having been imposed by the
servants of foreign interests and domestic elites. In the absence of
long-established habits of obedience to constitutional norms, rigid
constitutional guarantees of property and contractual rights are un-
likely to be respected at the critical juncture. Worse yet, the rest of
the constitution may consequently fall into disrepute, with resulting
jeopardy to newly-institutionalized norms of legality. Thus, from a
purely pragmatic standpoint, a constitution closely tied to communi-
tarian traditions and concerns might better serve to promote rule of
law (and thereby perhaps, paradoxically, the interests of the private
sector) than one based heavily on imported liberal tenets.
Efforts to assist in the establishment of constitutionalism in
Eastern and Central Europe must take seriously the persistence of
communitarian attitudes, attitudes attributable both to pre-Commu-
nist traditions and to four decades of life under a statist system that,
whatever its failings, inculcated expectations of material security and
relative equality that remain widely held. Such efforts ignore at their
peril the constitutionalist potential inherent in the communitarian vi-
sion. A resurgence of that vision, even in a radical form, is not alto-
liberalism is appropriate to the East. Wiktor Osiatynski has expressed the same position in
discussions with this author.
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gether improbable in the difficult years ahead; it need not, as the
foregoing analysis demonstrates, bring with it a return to the an-
ticonstitutionalist past.
